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Preface 
Physicists and philosophers alike have pondered the measurement problem in 
quantum mechanics since the beginning of the theory nearly a century ago.  Marcel 
Reginatto and I (2013) have made the case as have many others, Niels Bohr among 
them, that the problem is artificial and needs no resolution.  The purpose of my present 
essay is not to elaborate on this conclusion but rather to shed light on the reasons why 
the problem arose in the first place and why it persists today, a more sociological than 
physical reflection.  I am indebted to Freeman Dyson for his support of my forays into 
the foundations of quantum mechanics and, as a tribute to him, make use of his “birds 
and frogs” metaphor as explained below.  I am not suggesting that he would have agreed 
with my ruminations nor approved of my use of his metaphor.  On the other hand, from 
his writings and my conversations with him, it is clear that Dyson was as dismissive of 
the measurement problem as Bohr. 
 
The Measurement Problem 
Even though this is a thoroughly non-technical essay, it is incumbent upon me to 
provide at least a cursory account of the measurement problem.  The statistical nature of 
quantum theory results in conflicts with a classical notion of reality and is in large part 
responsible for the quantum measurement problem.  Here is, very roughly, how it comes 
about.  Consider the simple case of a single particle.  In the classical world, the state of 
the particle is expressed by its trajectory as a function of time, 𝑥(𝑡), a trajectory that 
satisfies Newton’s laws.  In the context of quantum mechanics, the state of the particle is 
given by a complex wave function of space and time, 𝜓(𝑥, 𝑡), that satisfies the 
Schrodinger equation.  The success of Schrodinger’s equation in describing the structure 																																																								⋇	sboughn@haverford.edu	
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of the hydrogen atom led to its acceptance as a law of nature after which the pressing 
question was the physical significance of 𝜓.  Following a suggestion by Einstein, Max 
Born postulated that the absolute value squared of the wave function, 𝜓 𝑥, 𝑡 !, 
corresponds to the probability density that the particle will be observed near the position 
x at the time t.  From then on, the probabilistic character of quantum mechanics was a 
fact of life and with it came the measurement problem. 
The simplest version is the following:  If  𝜓 𝑥, 𝑡 ! is interpreted as the probability 
density for the particle being near the position x at time t, then immediately after a 
measurement of its position at time t0, the wave function of the particle must change to 
indicate that the particle is now located precisely at the measured position, 𝑥!.  This can 
be expressed as 𝜓 𝑥, 𝑡! → 𝜓! 𝑥, 𝑡!  where  𝜓′ 𝑥, 𝑡! ! = 𝛿(𝑥 − 𝑥!).1  The problem is 
that Schrodinger’s equation allows no such transition.  What happened?  How can the 
act of measuring the position of the particle somehow supervene a law of nature?  In 
classical physics, the state 𝑥(𝑡) seems to present no such difficulty; however, we’ll get 
back to this point later.  There are many more subtle aspects of the measurement 
problem, but this simple example will suffice to frame the topic of my essay. 
 
Birds and Frogs  
In 2008, Freeman Dyson gave a lecture entitled Birds and Frogs to the American 
Mathematical Society in Vancouver.  The following is the opening paragraph of that talk 
(Dyson 2015 p. 37): 
“Some mathematicians are birds, others are frogs.  Birds fly high in the air and 
survey broad vistas of mathematics out to the far horizon.  They delight in concepts  
that unify our thinking and bring together diverse problems from different parts of the 
landscape.  Frogs live in the mud below and see only the flowers that grow nearby.  
They delight in the detail of particular objects, and they solve problems one at a time.  I 
happen to be a frog, but many of my best friends are birds.  The main theme of my talk 
tonight is this.  Mathematics needs both birds and frogs.  Mathematics is rich and 
beautiful because birds give it broad visions and frogs give it intricate details.  
Mathematics is both great art and important science because it combines generality of 
concepts with depths of structures.  It is stupid to claim that birds are better than frogs 
because they see farther, or that frogs are better than birds because they see deeper.  The 																																																								1	𝛿 𝑥 − 𝑥! 	is	the	Dirac	delta	function	that	fixes	the	particle’s	position	at	𝑥!.	
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world of mathematics is both broad and deep, and we need birds and frogs working 
together to explore it.”  
 
Dyson did not restrict his metaphor to mathematicians but also applied it to 
physicists, philosophers, and all other scientists for that matter.  Among physicists that 
Dyson considered birds are Newton, Einstein, Schrodinger, Weyl, Ed Witten, and (in a 
separate talk) John Wheeler.  Although he didn’t mention Bohr and Heisenberg 
(remember this was a talk to mathematicians), I strongly suspect that he would have 
labeled them as birds.  It’s interesting that along with himself he characterized John von 
Neumann as a frog even though “everyone expected him to fly like a bird”.  (I’ll come 
back to von Neumann later.)  I’m an experimentalist and am certainly a frog as, I expect, 
are most experimenters with some notable exceptions.  I imagine that Dyson would have 
labeled Ernst Mach, Enrico Fermi, and even one of my mentors, Robert Dicke, as birds.  
It’s the case that birds occasionally descend down into the mud as is clearly evident with 
these three.  So what does all this have to do with measurements?  First, let me expand a 
bit more on the measurement problem. 
 
Back to the Measurement Problem 
The measurement induced transition referred to above, 𝜓 𝑥 ⟶ 𝜓!(𝑥) such that 𝜓′ 𝑥 ! = 𝛿(𝑥 − 𝑥!),  is often referred to as wave function collapse or quantum state 
reduction.  Remember that this transition constitutes a violation of a law of physics, the 
Schrodinger equation.  Heisenberg may have been the first to draw attention to this 
apparent phenomenon in his 1927 seminal paper on the indeterminacy relation, the 
Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle as we now call it.  Dirac was more explicit in his 1930 
influential text, The Principles of Quantum Mechanics, (Dirac 1958): 
When we measure a real dynamical variable 𝜉, the disturbance involved in the  
act of measurement causes a jump in the state of the dynamical system…if we  
make a second measurement of the same dynamical variable 𝜉 immediately after  
the first, the result of the second measurement must be the same as that of the 
first…This conclusion must still hold if the second measurement is not actually 
made. In this way we see that a measurement always causes the system to jump  
into an eigenstate of the dynamical variable that is being measured, the eigenvalue 
this eigenstate belongs to being equal to the result of the measurement.  
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It was von Neumann who first endeavored to give an entirely quantum mechanical 
description of a measurement in his 1932 equally influential text, The Mathematical 
Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (von Neumann 1955).  He considered it manifest 
that the measuring apparatus was describable by quantum mechanics, i.e., by a quantum 
mechanical wave function.  This led him to specify two processes in quantum 
mechanics: the discontinuous change of states that occurs as a result of a measurement 
(state reduction); and the unitary evolution of quantum states via the Schrödinger 
equation.  He demonstrated that quantum mechanics was self-consistent including these 
two processes but didn’t seem to be particularly bothered by the fact that only one of 
them was governed by a law of physics, that is, by the Schrödinger equation. 
Bohr and Heisenberg also agreed that measuring apparatus could be described by 
quantum mechanics; however, unlike Dirac and von Neumann, neither of them found it 
necessary to invoke the process of wave function collapse.  From a 2016 correspondence 
with Dyson, I know he was in firm agreement with Bohr on this matter2.  So what led 
Dirac and von Neumann to the contrary point of view? 
 
Bird’s-eye View of the Measurement Problem 
Einstein, Bohr, Schrodinger, and Heisenberg were high-flying birds who surveyed 
“broad vistas” of the quantum nature of matter and radiation “out to the far horizon”.  
These physicists created3 a quantum theory to describe what they saw.  Dirac and von 
Neumann were frogs who set the stage for the measurement problem by characterizing  
wave function collapse as one of the two processes by which wave functions evolve, the 
other being the evolution described by the Schrodinger equation.  (Although Dirac does 
not appear in Dyson’s list of frogs, I suspect that he would have labeled Dirac as such.4)  
What did they, and others since then, see that led them to such a viewpoint?  I suspect 																																																								2	In	response	to	an	essay	I	wrote	criticizing	Bell’s	theorem,	Dyson	remarked	(Dyson	2016),	“I	particularly	like	your	last	page,	where	you	say	that	wave	function	collapse	is	not	predicted	by	quantum	mechanics.		That	is	true,	but	I	would	like	it	better	if	you	made	a	stronger	statement.		Wave	function	collapse	never	happens.		What	happens	is	that	the	wave	function	becomes	irrelevant	after	an	observation.	3	I	use	the	word	“created”	purposefully	for	quantum	mechanics	is,	indeed,	a	human	invention.	4	Consider	the	following	statement	by	Dirac	(1963):	“It	may	well	be	that	the	next	advance	in	physics	will	come	along	these	lines:	people	first	discovering	the	equations	and	then	needing	a	few	years	of	development	in	order	to	find	the	physical	idea	behind	these	equations.	My	own	belief	is	that	this	is	a	more	likely	line	of	progress	than	trying	to	guess	at	physical	pictures.”		Sounds	like	a	frog	to	me.	
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that it arises from a high altitude vantage point when these two frogs took to the air like 
birds.  Looking down on the quantum landscape from up there, they see a quantum 
world of matter and radiation and a myriad of experimental frogs building instruments 
and making measurements.  They also see many brilliant theorists, like Dyson, down in 
the mud solving problems in “intricate detail”.  Wave functions (quantum states) are 
everywhere.  From on high, wave functions might be mistaken for the physical world 
they are only intended to describe.  The trouble arises when one considers wave 
functions as part of the real physical world.  Then when a measurement is made and the 
wave function either disappears or changes in a way not described by Schrodinger’s 
equation, it seems imperative to investigate the details of this process. 
Wave functions are the tools of theorists in the same sense that laboratory 
instruments are the tools of experimentalists.  It’s certainly important to know and 
understand the types of tools one uses; however, there are questions about them that 
mustn’t be asked.  I’m an experimental physicist and my tools include voltmeters, 
oscilloscopes, lasers, etc.  I certainly endeavor to understand and know how to use these 
tools.  On the other hand certain questions about them make little sense.  For example 
after having used a tool in the context of a given experiment, if I were asked where will 
the tool next appear in an experiment, I would answer: “ I have no idea.  I haven’t even 
decided on what experiment to do next.”  Certainly no law of physics tells me what to do 
with my instruments.  Wave functions are tools that theorists use to make predictions 
about the outcomes of experiments.  Again certain questions about these tools make 
little sense.  If a theorist were asked what is the wave function of any given quantum 
system she might also answer: “I have no idea.  I haven’t yet decided what quantum 
process I choose to investigate.  After I do decide, I’ll know how to prepare the quantum 
system and will then be able to specify the appropriate wave function.”  As before, no 
law of physics directs the theorist to decide what prediction she will eventually make.   
I realize that I have tied the measurement problem to Dirac and von Neumann and 
then characterized them as frogs taking to the air like birds.5  This may be unfair for 
there are undoubtedly birds who also take the measurement problem seriously; although, 																																																								5	My	intension	is	not	to	belittle	von	Neumann	and	Dirac.		They	were	both	brilliant	theoretical	physicists	and	mathematicians.	
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none immediately come to mind.  Nevertheless, it’s my impression that the majority of 
physicists, birds and frogs alike, seem to be not particularly interested in the 
measurement problem nor consider it to be an important unresolved dilemma. 
 
Back to 𝒙(𝒕) 
 I began by drawing an analogy between the quantum mechanical wave function, 𝜓(𝑥, 𝑡), and the classical trajectory, 𝑥(𝑡), of a particle.  Why has former caused such 
consternation while the latter has not?  Certainly, the statistical aspect of 𝜓(𝑥, 𝑡) 
differentiates it from the precision implied by 𝑥(𝑡) and that difference provides part of 
the explanation.  However, I think we’re confusing two different aspects of the state of 
the particle.  The function 𝑥(𝑡) can represent either a history of the past locations of the 
particle or a prediction of its future locations.  On the other hand, 𝜓(𝑥, 𝑡) never 
represents a description of the past state of a particle but rather exclusively represents 
predictions of future observations. Dyson once remarked to me (Dyson 2016), “The 
wave function only describes probabilities for the result of an observation in the future.  
When the observation moves into the past, the result is described by facts instead of 
probabilities.”   
So if we wish to draw an analogy with quantum mechanics then we should stick 
to the interpretation of 𝑥(𝑡) as a prediction of future observations.  Take for example a 
pool player predicting the trajectory of the 8 ball after it has been struck by the cue ball.  
The player presumably applies (intuitively) Newtonian mechanics to properly wield the 
cue stick.  Like the analogous case with 𝜓(𝑥, 𝑡) in quantum mechanics, after the 
experiment, i.e., after the 8 ball falls into the corner pocket, the prediction represented 
by 𝑥(𝑡) becomes irrelevant.  If one chooses to describe the trajectory of the 8 ball after 
the end of the experiment, 𝑥 𝑡  invariably represents the trajectory that is the past 
history of the ball and so has no predictive power.  For example, this 𝑥 𝑡  can never be 
used to predict where the player places the 8 ball in the next rack, only the historical fact 
of where he did, in fact, place it.  After all, the player may not yet have decided how to 
rack the balls or even if he or the other player will do the racking.  So it seems that when 
used as a tool for prediction both 𝜓(𝑥, 𝑡) and 𝑥(𝑡) have limited domains.  Even the 
statistical uncertainty inherent in 𝜓(𝑥, 𝑡) is not foreign to the predictive 𝑥(𝑡).  As an 
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experimentalist, I am well aware that no prediction, quantum or classical, is free from 
uncertainty which is one reason why “error bars” are ubiquitous in physics papers. 
 
Do Wave Functions Provide a Complete Description of Reality? 
I’ve just argued that the measurement problem can be dismissed primarily because 
wave functions have a limited domain of applicability.  If this is the case, then it seems I 
am “forced to conclude that the quantum-mechanical description of physical reality 
given by wave functions is not complete”.  This was precisely the conclusion Einstein 
reached in the famous EPR paper (Einstein, Podolsky, & Rosen 1935).  So be it.  I’m 
quite willing to accept this charge as was Dyson (2016), “Einstein was right when he 
said that quantum mechanics gives an incomplete description of nature.”  In my last 
correspondence with him, Dyson (2019) wrote: “As you know, I disagree totally with 
the fashionable idea that quantum mechanics should be a complete description of nature.  
Following Niels Bohr, I consider the quantum world and the classical world to be 
equally real, two complementary views of nature.” 
 
Final Remark 
Those of us who dismiss the measurement problem might be accused of ignoring an 
important dilemma that, if resolved, would facilitate a clearer understanding of nature.  
However, I suspect that Dyson would resist the notion of tying up our understanding of 
the world in a neat little package.  In the same Birds and Frogs address to the American 
Mathematical Society that I quoted above, Dyson referred to Kurt Godel’s proofs that 
devastated Hilbert’s program to build a unique and solid foundation for mathematics.  
He clearly reveled in Godel’s achievement, as did von Neumann (Dyson 2015, p. 49):  
“After Godel, mathematics was no longer a single structure tied together with a unique 
concept of truth, but an archipelago of structures with diverse sets of axioms and diverse 
notions of truth.  Godel showed that mathematics is inexhaustible.”  As evidence for 
Dyson’s analogous sentiment about physics, I leave you with words from his 
contribution to a 2002 symposium in honor of John Wheeler, (Dyson 2015, p. 320): 
The structure of theoretical physics as a whole, and of quantum theory in 
particular, looks to me like a makeshift agglomeration of bits and pieces, not  
like a finished design.  If the structure of science is still provisional, still  
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growing and changing as the years go by, it makes no sense to impose on the 
structure a spurious philosophical coherence.  That is why I am skeptical of  
all attempts to squeeze quantum theory into a clean and tidy philosophical 
doctrine.  I prefer to leave you with the feeling that we still have a lot to learn. 
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